Reversal theory: a new approach to motivation, emotion and personality by Apter, Michael J.
ANUARIO DE PSICOLOG~A 
Núm. 42 - 1989 (3) 
MICHAEL J. APTER 
Purdue University 
U.S.A. 
REVERSAL THEORY A NEW APPROACH 
TO MOTIVATION, EMOTION 
AND PERSONALITY 
Michael J. Apter 
Purdue University 





The aim of this paper is to present a new theory of motivation, emotion 
and personality known as ((Reversal Theory)), the basic ideas of which were put 
forward originally by Smith and Apter in Britain in the mid-1970's, and later de- 
veloped into a more complete system by Apter in his books The Experience of 
Motivation (1982a) and Reversal Theory (1989). There are a number of reasons 
why the Spanish psychologist may wish to learn something of this theory: 
1. The theory is attracting increasing from researchers and practitioners 
around the world, and already three international conferences have been held on 
it. Papers from these have been published as two books (Apter, Fontana & Mur- 
gatroyd, 1985; Apter, Kerr & Cowles, 1988). A fourth international conference 
is due to take place in 1989. 
2. It attempts something which has long been unfashionable in psycho- 
logy: to integrate data from a variety of different areas in psychology into a uni- 
fied general theory. At the same time it does not lose sight of the practica1 as- 
pect, and indeed it was originally developed in the context of a child guidance 
clinic, and is currently being used by clinicians in a variety of contexts, as well 
as by psychologists in other applied settings. 
3. One aspect of its originality is that it introduces a new level of analysis 
into psychological discourse: the metamotivational level. It also postulates a new 
process of psychological change, that of metamotivational reversal, which it sug- 
gests should be added to those change processes which have previously been the 
main areas of interest and theoretical significance in psychology - most notably 
the processes of learning and maturation. 
4. It challenges a number of basic assumptions and emphases in psycho- 
logy, especially the assumption of homeostasis in theories of motivation and the 
emphasis on consistency in personality theory and psychometrics. In this way it 
invites radical re-thinking in these -and other- areas (Apter, 1984a). 
There will not be sufficient space in this paper to do more than sketch in 
several of the central ideas, but enough will be said to impart something of the 
flavor of the theory, and to give some ideas of the general approach involved. 
It is to be hoped that the reader will appreciate that the theory is less dogmatic 
and more subtle and complex than might appear from his necessarily brief account. 
Some Basic Concepts 
The starting point for reversal theory analyses, as implied by the title of 
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Apter's book, The Experience of Motivation (1982), is always some aspect of the 
way in which motivation is experienced. 
Let us take as an example of the reversal theory approach to a central ques- 
tion in the field of motivation: that of the relationship between the experienced 
intensity of arousal and hedonic tone. In its approach to this question reversal 
theory differs markedly from optima1 arousal theory, which of course has domi- 
na~ted research on arousal for a considerable period. Although optima1 arousal 
theory, following Hebb & Thompson (1954) and Hebb (1955) has taken many dif- 
ferent forms, all optima1 arousal theorists appear to assume that there is only 
orie arousal system and that this system has a single optima1 point on the arousal 
dimension. (In what follows, ccoptimal)) and ctpreferredn will relate to hedonic 
tone rather than performance). Thus, arousal is seen as assentially homeostatic, 
arid the resulting curve relating arousal and hedonic tone takes the form of an 
inverted U. 
Reversal theory, by contrast, argues that there are two alternative systems, 
each with its own optima1 point, and in place of the notion of homeostasis, the- 
refore, it substitutes the more complex notion of bistability (Apter, 1981). Fur- 
thermore, it argues that these two optima1 points or ccpreferred levels)), are to- 
w,ard opposite ends of the arousal dimension. So instead of there being one level 
of preferred arousal to which the organism attempts to return, and which is felt 
as; pleasant when obtained, reversal theory suggests that there are two such levels, 
only one of which is preferred at a given moment, this being the preferred level 
of the arousal system that is operative at that moment. Since the two alternative 
pireferred levels are assumed to be toward opposite ends of the felt arousal di- 
mension, switches between the systems involved are referred to as reversals. 
This idea can be made clear by reference to Figure 1, in which there are 
two hypothetical curves relating arousal to hedonic tone instead of the single curve 
o f optima1 arousal theory. Each of these curves relates to a different systems, one 
of which may be thought of as an ccarousal-avoiding)) systems and the other as 
arn ctarousal-seeking)) system. At any given level of actual experienced arousal, 
it is possible, according to the theory, to switch from the curve representing one 
of these systems to the curve representing the other -that is, a reversal may occur-. 
One of the results of such a reversal may be a sudden change of hedonic tone 
in relation to the level of arousal experienced at that moment. Since the two systems 
are characterized by different ways of interpreting a motivational phenomenon 
--arousal- they are described in reversal theory as metamotivational rather than 
motivational; and reversal from one to another such metamotivational system the- 
refore constitutes a rnetamotivational reversal. 
This view of the relationship between felt arousal and hedonic tone pre- 
sents a number of advantages over the optimal arousal theory interpretation. These 
can be summarized as follows. 
1. It accounts more easily than optima1 theory for the fact that on some 
occasions even very high arousal can be pleasant (e.g., during sexual behavior, 
or watching football or a bull-fight) and on other occasions even very low arou- 
sial can be pleasant (e.g., relaxing during a siesta or after a hard day's work). 
2. It accounts for four nouns that describe the four different combinations 
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of pleasant and unpleasant high and low levels of arousal -namely, excitement, 
anxiety, relaxation, and boredom- and it brings out the structural relationship 
between them. These four types of arousal are shown in the appropriate posi- 
tions on the graph. By contrast, optima1 arousal theory has difficulty in assimi- 
lating these four adjectives to its single curve and has to do so by making such 
unwarranted assumptions as that excitement is always a lower form of arousal 
than anxiety (cf. Hebb, 1955). This particular assumption of optimal arousal theory 
also implies that as arousal increases, excitement will always be felt before an- 
xiety, and that it will always be felt after anxiety as arousal decreases -an impli- 
cation for which there is no evidence and which would appear to be totally in- 
consistent with everyday experience. 
3. It allows for the possibility of certain rapid changes in the way in which 
22 M.J Apter 
arousal is felt. For example, it explains how anxiety can be converted almost ins- 
ta.ntaneously into excitement and vice versa. Like Zillmann's excitation-transfer 
theory (e.g., Zillmann, 1984), it helps to explain such psychological phenomena 
as the enjoyment of dangerous sport by suggesting that residual arousal is enjo- 
yed as excitement after the danger which produced the arousal has been overcome. 
The two different arousal-preference systems are, according to reversal theory, 
associated closely with (and may be regarded from some perspectives as subsys- 
tems of) a more all-embracing pair of metamotivational systems, which have been 
labelled in the theory as cctelic)) and ccparatelic)) (from the Greek words cctelic)) 
meaning a ccgoal)) and ((para)) meaning ccalongside))). These two systems are most 
conveniently characterized in terms of the phenomenological states with which 
they are associated. The telic state is defined as a state of mind in which one con- 
ceives oneself to be pursuing an important goal, the behavior being subsidiary 
and chosen to achieve the goal. The paratelic state of mind is one in which the 
orientation is toward the behavior itself, together with its concomitant sensations, 
in this case any goal being conceived as subsidiary and essentially an excuse for 
the behavior. In other words, there is a sense in which the goal is at the focus 
of the phenomenological field in the telic state and the ongoing activity is at the 
focus in the paratelic state. When a reversal does occur, this is somewhat analo- 
gous to a figure-ground perceptual reversal, with the figure being in one case a 
goal and in the other a form of activity. 
For example, in walking somewhere in the telic state one will conceive of one's 
goal -e.g., to arrive in time for an interview- as of overriding importance, and 
if it begins to appear that one will not achieve this goal one will choose some 
other means (for example, take a taxi). If on the other hand one is walking so- 
nnewhere in the paratelic state, then one's centre of interest is in enjoying the walk; 
and if in this case it turns out that one's destination is beyond one's reach in the 
time available, one will simply choose another destination, while continuing with 
one's walk. 
In the telic state, which is the state associated with low arousal preference, 
the state of mind is a serious one, and the concern is more likely to be with the 
future than the present; in this state the individual tries to plan ahead wherever 
possible. Anxiety arises if barriers to goal achievement occur, but the achieve- 
ment of a goal produces relaxation. In the paratelic state, which is the state asso- 
ciated with high arousal preference, the state of mind is a more lighthearted or 
playful one in which the orientation is toward the present moment and its enjoy- 
ment; it is also characterized by a preference for spontaneity rather than plan- 
ning. Intense experiences in this state are felt to be exciting, while a failure to 
achieve such intensity produces the experience of boredom. 
Reversal theory, then, sees the telic and paratelic states as a bistable pair 
of opposite but complementary phenomenological states, each associated with 
its own underlying system, and with the continua1 possibility of reversal between 
these states/systems. Although these states are defined in terms of the primary 
of goal or activity within experience, it will now be appreciated that the states 
themselves, and their underlying systems, are complex and involve a number of 
related characteristics or components. 
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What, then, are the factors which bring about, or facilitate, reversals bet- 
ween the telic and paratelic systems? Three general classes of such factors have 
been proposed: 
1. Contingent factors. By this is meant events and situations which, when 
suitably interpreted by the individual, facilitate or induce a reversal. For exam- 
ple, a sudden physical danger may induce the telic system if it is not already in 
operation, while escape from such a danger may play a part in inducing the para- 
telic system; social cues like frowning may facilitate reversal to the telic system 
while cues like smiling and laughing may facilitate reversal to the paratelic; and 
some contexts, like a waiting room at a hospital, will normally help to bring about 
a reversal into the telic mode whereas others, like the sports stadium, will nor- 
mally help rather to bring the paratelic system into operation. 
2. Frustration. The second general category is that of frustration of all kinds 
in achieving the satisfactions of the prevailing system, so that if the frustration 
is strong enough it will eventually induce the opposite system on its own or with 
the help of other factors. For example, if one is unable to achieve a serious goal 
one may switch at a certain point to the paratelic system and playfully fantasize 
goal achievement. 
3 .  Satiation. By this is meant that there is an innate process which opera- 
tes independently of contingent events in such a way as increasingly to facilitate 
reversal from the prevailing system over time. In other words, it builds up in strength 
unti1 it is strong enough, with other factors, to bring about a reversal; and even- 
tually it will become strong enough to bring about a reversal on its own even in 
the absence of other factors. Having brought about the reversal and dissipated 
its strength, it will start building up again in such a way as to help to induce a 
new reversal. So what is being suggested here is that there is an innate dynamic 
for change. In this the relationship between telic and paratelic systems is seen as 
not unlike that between waking and sleeping: when one has been awake long enough 
one will eventually go to sleep despite other factors, and when one has been as- 
leep long enough one will eventually wake up if one has not been woken up in 
the meantime by some externa1 occurrence. 
One thing which this third postulate does is to show quite clearly that re- 
versal theory is not a theory of situational specificity: because of the process of 
satiation it is quite posible to confront a certain situation in the telic system on 
one occasion and the paratelic system on another, and indeed to reverse back- 
ward and forward from one system to the other during the course of the same 
continuing activity. It will be realized from all this that reversal is conceived to 
be an involuntary process which occurs when the factors for change are, in com- 
bination, stronger than those which would inhibit it. 
Reversal Theory and Personality 
One general point about reversal theory, as should now be evident, is that 
it implies an inherent inconsistency and self-contradiction in human nature. At 
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orie moment a person may crave excitement and at another avoid exactly those 
arousing situations which he was so keen to experience a short time before; at 
one time he way experience his job as an obligation and at a later time experience 
the very same job as a kind of game. In such ways people differ not only from 
each other but from themselves at different times (and even when confronted by 
th,e same situation). In other words, there is a kind of interna1 dialectic, which 
underlies the changeability and complexity of human experience and behavior. 
However, this is not to deny that there are consistencies within individuals. 
One of these is the innate bias or tendency which they may have to be subject 
to one system or the other. This is known in reversal theory as ccdominance)). 
Thus the telic dominant individual is the person who is more likely at a given 
time, other things being equal, to be doing something which he or she conceives 
to be serious and important, attempting to avoid anxiety, and more likely to be 
seeing the current activity in a long-term perspective, than the paratelic domi- 
nant individual. The latter is more likely, other things being equal, to be feeling 
and acting in a light-hearted, playful, and here-and-now oriented way, and 100- 
king for excitement. How far this is likely in each case will depend on the degree 
of telic or paratelic dominance involved. Another way of putting this is to say 
that the factors which tend to induce the paratelic system have to be stronger in 
order to bring about such a reversal in the telic dominant than the paratelic do- 
minant person, and vice versa for those factors which then to induce the telic system. 
However, it must be emphasized that telidparatelic dominance is not a trait 
in the conventionally accepted sense, since telic dominant people will still be ex- 
pected to spend certain periods in the paratelic system, and may be just as play- 
ful and excitement-seeking when this system is operating as those who are telic 
dominant. At the same time, as we have seen, the telic and paratelic systems are 
also not situationally dependent in any simple way, or simple one-emotion sta- 
tes; and so reversal theory is also not a state theory in the usually sense. Rather, 
il. introduces a whole new approach to the traditional, and increasingly sterile, 
state-versus-trait debate. 
The theory as a whole 
It should be added that three other pairs of metamotivational systems have 
also been postulated in reversal theory (Apter, 1983, 1988, 1989): the negati- 
vism/conformity pair, mastery/sympathy pair and the autocentric/allocentric pair. 
The first of these concerns the opposite ways in which an individual can see him- 
self to be acting in relation to externa1 rules and pressures (with them or against 
them); the seconds is about the opposite ways in which transactions between self 
and other can be experienced (as involving taking or yielding in the case of mas- 
tery, and giving or being given in the case of sympathy); and the third is about 
whether the individual is acting on his own behalf or that of someone else with 
j~hom he is identifying. Each member of each pair is associated with its own uni- 
que range of emotions. More information on these and other reversal theory con- 
cepts like cccognitive synergy)) (the experience of mutually contradictory proper 
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ties in relation to an object, person or situation) will be found in Apter (1982, 
1989) and Apter et al (1985, 1988). 
These concepts, taken together, allow reversal theory to provide a coherent 
and unitary explanation for a wide range of apparently diverse and unrelated phe- 
nomena. These include, for example, addiction (OYConnell, 1988, Doherty & Matt- 
hews, 1988), esthetic experience (Apter, 1982c, 1984b) sexual dysfunction and per- 
version (Apter & Smith, 1979a), antisocial behavior in childhood, adolescence, 
and old age (Apter, 1983; Bowers, 1985), family interaction patterns (Apter & 
Smith, 1979b), the generation of religious myths and rituals (Apter, 1985), creati- 
vity (Fontana, 1985), soccer hooliganism (Kerr, 1988), sports performance (Kerr, 
1987), gambling (Brown, 1987), and the enjoyment of humor. For example, it is 
argued that humor is a special form of paratelic high arousal which is also 
characterized by a number of other specifiable subjective properties having 
to do with cognitive synergy (Apter & Smith, 1977; Apter, 1982b; Svebak & Ap- 
ter, 1987). 
Empirical Research on Reversal Theory 
One of the ways in which the hypotheses of reversal theory have been in- 
vestigated is through the development of psychometric measures. In particular, 
a measure of telic dominance has been developed. This is the Telic Dominance 
Scale (TDS) (Murgatroyd, Rushton, Apter, & Ray, 1978) consisting of three subs- 
cales to measure seriousmindedness, planning-orientation and arousal-avoidance. 
This scale has now been used for a variety of purposes, experimental and ap- 
plied, in many countries throughout the world and there are translations into a 
number of languages. (For a survey of the development, validation and applica- 
tion of this scale, see Murgatroyd, 1985). A conveniently simple measure of te- 
lic/paratelic states is also now also available (Svebak & Murgatroyd, 1985), this 
indicating whether the telic system is operating at a given moment in time (i.e., 
the individual is ttin the telic state))) or the paratelic system (i.e., the individual 
is ttin the paratelic state))). 
A major way in which such measurement devices have been used is in the 
investigation of the psychophysiology of both telic dominance and of the telic 
and paratelic systems. Svebak and his colleagues, in a series of reports (e.g., Sve- 
bak, 1983, 1984, 1985a, 1986a & b; Apter & Svebak, 1986; Svebak & Murgatroyd, 
1985; Svebak & Grossman, 1985; Svebak, Nordby & Ohman, 1987; Svebak, Storfjeil 
& Dalen, 1982), have shown that these states/systems and/or forms of dominan- 
ce have certain identifiable physiological characteristics, demonstrating that they 
are not just phenomenological constructs but are grounded in solid biological 
ctreality)). For example, electromyographic gradients from passive musculature are 
significantly steeper in subjects in the telic than the paratelic state when these 
subjects have to exert effort in some experimental situation; heart rate accelera- 
tion is significantly greater in telic dominant that paratelic dominant subjects under 
conditions of threat; deeper thoracic breathing is found in telic dominant sub- 
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jects; and paratelic dominant subjects show higher EEG power-spectrum scores 
(parietal) for the theta and beta bands than telic dominant subjects during task 
performance, indicating that paratelic dominant subjects may be characterized 
by large cortical areas operating in synchrony ccdriven)) by a common source rat- 
her than the comparatively small areas in synchrony that appear to be more re- 
presentative of telic dominant subjects. These and other findings are reviewed and 
discussed in detail by Svebak (1985b) and Apter (1989). 
If the sign of the strength of a theory is that it gives rise to unexpected 
discoveries that would not have been predicted by other theories, this represen- 
ting what Lakatos (1974) has designated a progressive rather than degenerating 
research programme, then reversal theory may be said to be showing signs of 
strength. Here are two examples. Firstly, reversal theory would predict that it is 
not the case that everyone is upset to some degree or another by stress. On the 
contrary, reversal theory would make the surprising prediction that some people, 
i.e., paratelic dominant individuals, would be likely to enjoy stress up to a certain 
point because this would cause higher arousal, and high levels of arousal are en- 
joyed by such individuals. (Above a certain point, however, the telic state would 
be likely to be induced even in those who are strongly paratelic dominant so that 
the effect would die away beyond these levels of stress). Evidence exactly consis- 
tent with this prediction has been presented by Martin (1985), and Martin, Kui- 
per, Olinger, & Dobbin (1987) who showed that for telic dominant subjects, the 
greater the stress, the greater the mood disturbance. But for paratelic dominant 
subjects, exactly the reverse relationship was found: up to a certain level of stress, 
the more the stress the better the mood. It was not that these subjects were simply 
less vulnerable to stress: they were thriving on it and positively enjoying it. (Be- 
yond this point the relationship became the same as that for telic dominant sub- 
jects, implying that increasing numbers of this group were reversing to the telic 
state as stress built up). This evidence may be said to be strongly supportive of 
the unique reversal theory view of stress. 
Secondly, if people have a choice of a range os stimuli which can be placed 
along a dimension from highly arousing to highly de-arousing, reversal theory 
would predict that, since everyone at a given moment is either in the arousal-seeking 
or arousal-avoiding state, they will tend to choose stimuli from the extremities 
of such a dimension rather than more centrally-placed stimuli, and to switch from 
time to time from a preference for stimuli at one extremity to a preference for 
stimuli at the other. Using color stimuli from across the spectrurn, analyzed for each 
individual in terms of how arousing or de-arousing each color was for them per- 
sonally, Walters, Apter, & Svebak (1982) found that, when subjects (116 office 
workers) were asked to make color preference choices at regular intervals during 
the working day (some of the subjects being tested for as many as eight days), 
they did indeed behave in the way expected -uniquely- by reversal theory. That 
is, they tended to choose either colors which they personally found highly arou- 
sing or highly de-arousing, ignoring intermediate colors, and to reverse from time 
to time from one relative extreme to the other. 
A recent and more detailed and extensive review of all the research which 
has been carried out to date on reversal theory will be found in Apter (1989). 
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Conclusions 
The basic postulate of reversal theory is that there are a number of pairs 
of alternative systems available to the individual for interacting with his or her 
environment, and at any given time a subset of these (one from each of the pairs) 
will be in operation. Thus at one time the individual may be characterized as in 
the telic, conformist, mastery and autocentric states, at another as in the parate- 
lic, conformist, sympathy and autocentric states, and so on. This means that from 
the reversal theory perspective the individual is continually in flux; and it is ar- 
gued that any psychological theory which does not take into account such chan- 
geability will produce an oversimplified and unconvincing model of human nature. 
As we have seen, these alternative systems are characterized by reversal theory 
as metamotivational, and it is claimed therefore that the metamotivational level 
and the changes which take place at this level, must be taken into account if a 
full and meaningful picture of human activity is to be achieved. Among other 
things this constitutes, as we have seen, a challenge to all theories of motivation 
which are based on the idea of homeostasis or equilibrium, and all theories of 
personality which are more interested in consistencies than inconsistencies -in 
other words to all previous major theories of motivation and personality. 
The aim of this paper is to present a new general theory of motivation, 
emotion and personality known as <<Reversal Theory)). Some of the main con- 
cepts of the theory are briefly outlined, especially the notions of bistability (which 
is contrasted with homeostasis), metamotivation and metamotivational reversal, 
the telic and paratelic systems, and metamotivational dominance. Some empiri- 
cal research generated by reversal theory, including psychometric and psychophy- 
siological research, is also briefly reviewed. 
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